I just posted a substantive remark about Gettysburg but thought this July 4 question might be more propounding.
Yes, Pemberton surrendered to Grant on July 4 after nearly 7 weeks of siege.
I say: Vicksburg was on the spit and the charcoal fired when Pemberton lost to Grant at Champion Hill on 5/16. Prior to that, Grierson's Raid had shown the feebleness of Mississippi's defense, Grant had cut off most of the Mississippi River to traffic, the Inland Navy's gunboats were making River crossings extremely chancy, and Grant had scared Johnston out of Raymond.
It's nice to have a party to celebrate on July 4, but that was just when the poor roast was done cooking and served up.
Despite recent rulings by an ostensible arm of the Federal Government, Happy Birthday, Us!
Personally, I hope to visit the local military cemetery (Presidio of San Francisco), lay a few flowers on the grave of Pauline Cushman Fryer, very successful Union spy. Awarded the rank of major by President Garfield.
And one of the foremost in-the-weeds historians of Gettysburg continues his chemo. See his gofundme page: Eric Wittenberg.
Second, the meme is priceless because it is true, as we both know from teaching those events. Vicksburg was such an important US Army victory; as Lincoln said, “The Father of Waters again flows unvexed to the sea.” As for Meade, he stopped the rebel advance but his failure to stop Lee’s retreat was responsible, IMHO, for all the death and destruction of the next two years. Though it may also be said that Rosecrans had some responsibility, since he also failed to strike a final blow and in September lost decisively, and brutally, at Chickamauga.
Finally, the more I learn, the more I have yet to learn, as I was unaware of the Meade Hearings. I look forward to reading Hyde’s book - thx!
Otis thanks you. I do think it is worth reading Kent Masterson Brown's book *Meade At Gettysburg: A Study of Command.* It will definitely force you to reassess Meade's performance during the retreat from Gettysburg. Good to hear from you, Suzanne.
I enthusiastically and strongly agree with KML that KMB's 'Meade at Gettysburg' totally redefines the view of how Meade conducted his Blue pieces in the chess match against the Grey pieces. Until July 3, it was a game of blindfold chess as both sides were largely ignorant of where the others' pieces were. Also lost to Lee was knowledge of where his own Grey cavalier, Stuart, was and what he was doing.
Of course, everyone knew where the Rodes, Early, and Jenkins pieces were. Waiting two days for orders to attack across the Susquehanna River bridges at Wrightsville and Harrisburg.
The citizens of Maryland knew where Stuart was: trapped behind the AoP screen from Monocacy to Westminster.
One other big point KMB made: at the start of the book, Buford sent in an urgent requisition for 50,000 booties (troops wore shoes and sox, troopers wore boots and booties). In the scramble to get the AoP across the Potomac, new supply lines could not be set up so his troops had only what they were bringing. At the close of KMB's account of the battle, Buford's men still didn't have their booties.
KMB describes how Meade came to learn about Pipe Creek: a friendly farmer on whose land Meade's men were pitching his tent came out to chat and give him a tour. There was Pipe Creek, and its south side had a higher elevation than the north from which Lee would have to approach. A burning match ignites the candle (pre-Edisonian light bulb analogy attempt).
One key to Meade's early actions was to inadvertently trap Stuart's cavalry where it could not link with Ewell and report recon intel to Lee. That was the first step of his Pipe Creek plan, assign each corps a fallback sector to a length of that creek. (Meanwhile his best cavalryman continued his assignment from Hooker to probe north for Lee's seven missing divisions.)
The unacknowledged strategy that KMB discovered: Meade sent his pieces on the left side of the Pipe Creek line forward as a recon-in-force. The First, Eleventh, and Third corps trailing somewhat were to head towards Cashtown or further, locate the bulk of Lee's army, attack and pin it in place. Then Meade would know specifically where the other 7/9 of the ANV was located.
The I-XI-Buford wing was brilliantly led (perhaps, for Howard, just highly competent leadership, but these generals agreed to hold at Gettysburg, but Howard drew flat land to defend against vastly larger forces). They all agreed to tell Meade they'd lucked into great defensive land to defend.
As badly as Hill's and Ewell's divisions clobbered I and XI, if Hill (and Henry Heth) had followed Lee's orders, they'd have pulled back perhaps to Cashtown or at least defended Herr Ridge. With Reynolds' force pushing onto and past Herr Ridge, they risked being totally cut off and captured with few survivors. That was Meade's idea. Though losing two corps including the Iron Brigade against a compact ANV was a big potential loss, he'd have gathered his army to still deploy in his fishhook.
If Lee had followed his own plan, which Longstreet liked, you'd have two defensive strategies on perfect land for the defensive: long ridges and high mountains all the way from Seminary Ridge to the Potomac.
Meade would be still hysterically badgered by Lincoln to expel Lee; Lee had a limited supply of ammo, his plundered supplies would run low eventually, his horses would run out of food and shoes, and sooner or later he needed to defend Richmond. Neither knew a 10-day deluge was imminent (read 'The Howling Storm' and KMB's equally excellent 'Retreat from Gettysburg' PLUS just about anything by Wittenberg and Mingus) (n.b.: Eric Wittenberg has a Gofundme page, this year he was hit with a cancer diagnosis), nor that on July 4 Pemberton would surrender Vicksburg to Grant. Nor that soon after that, NYC would have its anti-Draft Riot that lynched African Americans. Also, Lee (according to KMB) did not realize his precious pontoon boats had been all nearly destroyed by a combo of his own small cavalry guard failing to tend to that one duty while a small Union raiding cavalry force found and destroyed them.
That gameboard situation would have been: two almost-equally-well-armed forces, numerically equal (without I and XI Corps), both occupying impregnable ridgelines constructed by engineers, hoping the other general would attack first.
I just posted a substantive remark about Gettysburg but thought this July 4 question might be more propounding.
Yes, Pemberton surrendered to Grant on July 4 after nearly 7 weeks of siege.
I say: Vicksburg was on the spit and the charcoal fired when Pemberton lost to Grant at Champion Hill on 5/16. Prior to that, Grierson's Raid had shown the feebleness of Mississippi's defense, Grant had cut off most of the Mississippi River to traffic, the Inland Navy's gunboats were making River crossings extremely chancy, and Grant had scared Johnston out of Raymond.
It's nice to have a party to celebrate on July 4, but that was just when the poor roast was done cooking and served up.
Despite recent rulings by an ostensible arm of the Federal Government, Happy Birthday, Us!
Personally, I hope to visit the local military cemetery (Presidio of San Francisco), lay a few flowers on the grave of Pauline Cushman Fryer, very successful Union spy. Awarded the rank of major by President Garfield.
And one of the foremost in-the-weeds historians of Gettysburg continues his chemo. See his gofundme page: Eric Wittenberg.
The last report I heard is that Eric is doing as well as can be expected, but support is still very much needed. Thanks for mentioning this, Norm.
Here is the link to help one of our finest Civil War historians: https://www.gofundme.com/f/please-consider-helping-eric-and-susan-wittenberg
First things first - hugs & love to Otis 🥰.
Second, the meme is priceless because it is true, as we both know from teaching those events. Vicksburg was such an important US Army victory; as Lincoln said, “The Father of Waters again flows unvexed to the sea.” As for Meade, he stopped the rebel advance but his failure to stop Lee’s retreat was responsible, IMHO, for all the death and destruction of the next two years. Though it may also be said that Rosecrans had some responsibility, since he also failed to strike a final blow and in September lost decisively, and brutally, at Chickamauga.
Finally, the more I learn, the more I have yet to learn, as I was unaware of the Meade Hearings. I look forward to reading Hyde’s book - thx!
Otis thanks you. I do think it is worth reading Kent Masterson Brown's book *Meade At Gettysburg: A Study of Command.* It will definitely force you to reassess Meade's performance during the retreat from Gettysburg. Good to hear from you, Suzanne.
Thx for the recommendation. Ordered, arriving next week. 👍
I enthusiastically and strongly agree with KML that KMB's 'Meade at Gettysburg' totally redefines the view of how Meade conducted his Blue pieces in the chess match against the Grey pieces. Until July 3, it was a game of blindfold chess as both sides were largely ignorant of where the others' pieces were. Also lost to Lee was knowledge of where his own Grey cavalier, Stuart, was and what he was doing.
Of course, everyone knew where the Rodes, Early, and Jenkins pieces were. Waiting two days for orders to attack across the Susquehanna River bridges at Wrightsville and Harrisburg.
The citizens of Maryland knew where Stuart was: trapped behind the AoP screen from Monocacy to Westminster.
One other big point KMB made: at the start of the book, Buford sent in an urgent requisition for 50,000 booties (troops wore shoes and sox, troopers wore boots and booties). In the scramble to get the AoP across the Potomac, new supply lines could not be set up so his troops had only what they were bringing. At the close of KMB's account of the battle, Buford's men still didn't have their booties.
KMB describes how Meade came to learn about Pipe Creek: a friendly farmer on whose land Meade's men were pitching his tent came out to chat and give him a tour. There was Pipe Creek, and its south side had a higher elevation than the north from which Lee would have to approach. A burning match ignites the candle (pre-Edisonian light bulb analogy attempt).
One key to Meade's early actions was to inadvertently trap Stuart's cavalry where it could not link with Ewell and report recon intel to Lee. That was the first step of his Pipe Creek plan, assign each corps a fallback sector to a length of that creek. (Meanwhile his best cavalryman continued his assignment from Hooker to probe north for Lee's seven missing divisions.)
The unacknowledged strategy that KMB discovered: Meade sent his pieces on the left side of the Pipe Creek line forward as a recon-in-force. The First, Eleventh, and Third corps trailing somewhat were to head towards Cashtown or further, locate the bulk of Lee's army, attack and pin it in place. Then Meade would know specifically where the other 7/9 of the ANV was located.
The I-XI-Buford wing was brilliantly led (perhaps, for Howard, just highly competent leadership, but these generals agreed to hold at Gettysburg, but Howard drew flat land to defend against vastly larger forces). They all agreed to tell Meade they'd lucked into great defensive land to defend.
As badly as Hill's and Ewell's divisions clobbered I and XI, if Hill (and Henry Heth) had followed Lee's orders, they'd have pulled back perhaps to Cashtown or at least defended Herr Ridge. With Reynolds' force pushing onto and past Herr Ridge, they risked being totally cut off and captured with few survivors. That was Meade's idea. Though losing two corps including the Iron Brigade against a compact ANV was a big potential loss, he'd have gathered his army to still deploy in his fishhook.
If Lee had followed his own plan, which Longstreet liked, you'd have two defensive strategies on perfect land for the defensive: long ridges and high mountains all the way from Seminary Ridge to the Potomac.
Meade would be still hysterically badgered by Lincoln to expel Lee; Lee had a limited supply of ammo, his plundered supplies would run low eventually, his horses would run out of food and shoes, and sooner or later he needed to defend Richmond. Neither knew a 10-day deluge was imminent (read 'The Howling Storm' and KMB's equally excellent 'Retreat from Gettysburg' PLUS just about anything by Wittenberg and Mingus) (n.b.: Eric Wittenberg has a Gofundme page, this year he was hit with a cancer diagnosis), nor that on July 4 Pemberton would surrender Vicksburg to Grant. Nor that soon after that, NYC would have its anti-Draft Riot that lynched African Americans. Also, Lee (according to KMB) did not realize his precious pontoon boats had been all nearly destroyed by a combo of his own small cavalry guard failing to tend to that one duty while a small Union raiding cavalry force found and destroyed them.
That gameboard situation would have been: two almost-equally-well-armed forces, numerically equal (without I and XI Corps), both occupying impregnable ridgelines constructed by engineers, hoping the other general would attack first.